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April 13, 1984 Conference 
List 1, Sheet 3 
No. 83-1378 Cert to CA 6 
( 
\)~ 
KAVANAUGH, et al. 
(Edwards, Contie, Spiegel) 
v. 
LUCEY Federal/Civil Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Petr challenges the federal courts' con-






tive assistance of counsel by his counsel's failure to perfect an 
appeal. 
2. FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: Resp was convicted in 
state court of drug trafficking. Resp's retained counsel filed 
an appellate brief, but he failed to file a Statement of Appeal, 
as required by Kentucky law, and his appeal was dismissed. 
Resp then filed a habeas corpus action in federal DC, 
contending that he had been deprived of effective assistance of 
counsel on appeal. During the course of proceedings, resp and 
petr stipulated that there was no equal protection violation. 
The DC granted the petition, although it stayed the writ to per-
mit the state to reinstate petr's direct appeal. The CA af-
firmed. Although the states are not required to create an a.ppel-
------
late system, the federal courts on habeas can correct violations 
_____...; 
of due process that occurred in the course of appellate proceed-
ings. E.g., Ross v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600 (1974). Resp's coun-
sel's blunder in seeking an appeal denied petr effective assist 
ance of counsel and thereby violated due process. 
3. CONTENTIONS: As long as the state's procedural 
rules comport with the requirements of due process and equal pro-
tection, the state constitutionally may dismiss an appeal that 
does not comply with the rules. See McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 
684, 687 (1894). The Sixth Amendment by its terms applies to 
"criminal prosecutions" not appeals. And this Court's cases on 
the rights of indigents in the appeals process have rested on 
equal•protection, that is concededly not violated in this case. 
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956}; Smith v. Bennett, 365 
U.S. 708 (1961}; Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963}. 
Resp: Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974}, established 
that the Due Process as well as the Equal Protection clause 
places constraints upon the state's operation of its appellate 
processes. The Court has established that an indigent's appel-
late counsel must provide a minimum level of competent represen-
tation. Entsminger v. Iowa, 386 U.S. 748 (1967}; Anders v. Cali-
fornia, 386 U.S. 738 (1967}. The CAs have reached the same re-
sult as the decision here in indistinguishable factual circum-
stances. See, e.g., Macon v. Lash, 458 F.2d 942, 949-950 (CA7 
1972} (opinion of JUSTICE STEVENS, then Circuit Judge} ; Leventhal 
v. Gavin, 396 F.2d 441 (CAl 1968}. (The response includes three 
( pages listing citations to cases from the CAs and the state 
courts. Resp, at 9-10, 12-13.} If resp's attorney negligently 
failed to file the petition in accord with the state court's 
rules, a sanction should be imposed upon the attorney, rather 
than requiring the client to forfeit his legal rights.~, 496 
F. 2d 1274, 1278 (CA5 1974}. 
( 
4. DISCUSSION: As resp observes, there are a ~ st of r-
cases holding that a defendant was denied effective assistance of 
counsel where counsel's error effectively denied defendant a 
right of appeal. Those cases seem to be generally distinguish-
able in two ways. They generally (although not always} involve 
~
appointecytather than retained counsel; and they rest upon fac-
tors in addition to the mere failure to comply with the state's 
I 




or inept or that a good faith effort to comply with the rules was 
made, at least by the defendant. E.g., Horsley v. Simpson, 400 
F.2d 708, 711-712 CA5 1968); Rosinski v. United States, 450 F.2d 
59 (CA6 1972); Blanchard v. Brewer, 429 F.2d 89, 91-92 (CA8 
1970). Here, in contrast, the feder 1 court found ineffective --
as~nce on the basis ~ 01§ of retained counsel's failure to 
comply with the rules of the appellate court. It does not appear 
from the papers filed here that resp was indigent at the time of 
his trial or appeal. 
It is true that the present decision deprives the state 
of all power to enforce its procedural rules on appeal. If coun-
sel's failure ~to comply with those rules leads to dismissal, the 
appellant has received ineffective assistance of counsel and must 
be permitted to appeal again with new counsel. The courts are 
well familiar with the tension between relieving a defendant of 
the consequences of counsel's error and enforcing state rules of 
procedural default. The tension is particularly acute when eval-
uating claims of ineffective assistance at the appellate stage 
because counsel's failure to take the simple steps required to 
perfect an appeal seems to be in itself sufficient to establish 
incompetence. One way out of this dilemma, implicit in the CA .._ _________ ____ 
decisions such as those noted above, is to require on habeas at 
least some evidence that the failure to comply with appellate ~ ._ ~ . 





I would not grant this case plenary consideration. It 






that leaves some efficacy to state procedural rules. The present 
decision appears to be an unfortunate aberration. Petr neither 
cites a conflict nor shows that the CAs in elaborating the doc-
trine of ineffective assistance generally have eviscerated state 
procedural rules. Further, the case does not promise to clarify 
the narrow issue that it raises. Petr's brief focuses upon the 
question whether there is any constitutional right to effective 
assistance of appellate counsel and emphatically denies that the 
Due Process clause speaks to the question. In light of the sub-
stantial body of precedent on this subject in the federal courts, 
/r,o, , 5' Y) 
including this Court, pe¥f •s approach to the problem seems mis-
'-' 
guided. In sum, the Court should wait to see whether other CAs 
adopt the indiscriminate approach to appellate ineffective as-
------------sistance cases exemplified here before itself taking up the mat---- --------
ter. 
Summary reversal would not be unreasonable, as the deci-
sion below does deprive state appellate procedural rules~ of all -----~------------
effect. The difficulty with summary reversal is that the Court 
'-~-c::::> l 
s)lould announce no general standard for this area without plenary 
consideration. An opinion reversing summarily could say only 
that the present decision went "too far," without indicating how 
far was far enough. 
IFP Status: Petr has submitted the necessary affidavit. 
5. RECOMMENDATION: I recommend denial. 
There is a response. 
April,4, 1984 Charny Opin in petn 
/ 
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No. 83-1378, Kavanaugh (Prison Superintendent) v. Lucey 
Memorandum for File 
This is a summary memorandum on the basis of a pre-
liminary reading of the briefs. 
The opinions below and the briefs of the parties are, 
for the most part, poorly written. This is not unusual in 
Kentucky cases, though the federal court opinions in this 
case are no credit to either of them. 
Respondent (defendant) was convicted of drug offenses 
in state court. His appeal (apparently to the Kentucky 
Court of Criminal Appeals) was dismissed because his retained 
lawyer failed to file the Statement of Appeal required by 
Kentucky law. Apparently this is a procedural requirement 
that resulted in dismissal even though counsel had filed a 
timely brief and otherwise had complied with Kentucky procedure. 
The Kentucky Constitution, by an Amendment in 1974, confers the 
right of appeal from a criminal conviction. 
In this Federal Habeas Corpus proceeding the DC found 
a due process violation of the Federal Constitution where 
the appeal was denied because of the "ineffective assistance of 
counsel". The DC conditioned granting of the Writ on Kentucky 
now allowing appeal or retrying the defendant. 
The Court of Appeals (CA 6) affirmed, quoting from and 
pgreeing with the DC's decision. We granted cert apparently 
No. 83-1378 3. 
sense between an equal protection and a due process violation. 
Petitioner responds that the Griffin line of cases all turned 
on discrimination against indigents, a factor absent in this 
case as defendant had retained counsel and does not base his 
claim on indigency. 
If I had represented the defendant, I would have based 
my argument primarily on the fact that the Kentucky constitution 
confers a right to appeal and that effective assistance of 
counsel is necessary to enjoy that right. Yet respondent does 
not argue the case that way. Rather, he seems to say that 
whatever may be the law in the states, the federal constitution 
requires effective assistance of counsel on state appeal. 
I have not read the federal cases, even those by our Court. 
Respondent's brief sites an array of cases that are said to 
support his position (see Appendix to Brief), and claims that 
there is not a single case to the contrary. The case is an 
interesting one, and I will be interested in my Clerk's views. 
LFP 
., 
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I. Facts and Decisions Below. 
Resp was found guilty by a jury in the Madison {Ky.) 
Circuit Court of trafficking in LSD and cocaine. The court en-
tered final judgment on March 29, 1977 and retained counsel filed 
a timely notice of appeal. In addition, counsel prepared the 
record and filed a brief with the Ky. Ct. App. on time. In the 
brief, he argued that the admission of certain photographs, the 
jury charge, and the prosecutor's comments during summation each 
constituted reversible error. 
The Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on 
the ground that resp had failed to comply with Ky. R. App. P. 
l.095{a) {1). This rule requires that the Ky. Ct. App. pleadings 
contain "[t] he same information as required in a statement of 
appeal in the Supreme Court pursuant to RAP 1.090." Ky. R. App. 
P. 1.090, in turn, requires various information such as the names 
of the parties, the names and addresses of counsel, the name and 
address of the trial judge, the date of judgment and of the no-
tice of appeal, and various procedural information. All of this 
information appears to have been contained in the other documents 
petr submitted for the appeal. 
The Ky. Ct. App. dismissed the appeal because "the ap-
pellant failed to supply the information required by RAP 
l.095{a) {1) ." App. 37a. It also denied resp's motion for recon-
sideration and the Ky. S.Ct. later refused review, thereby af-
' 
firming the dismissal. 
Resp filed for habeas in E.D.Ky. {Moynahan, J.). The DC 
adopted the magistrate's report and recommendation, which found 
No. 83-1378 page 3. 
~~~~d,._,. 
, _,.,.~ /4~ ~ ~~f- HJ ~ ~ 
I>~ ~~ - ~ ~ -
that ::~ "was denied the effective assistance of counsel on ap- ~ kJ 
peal · when his retained attorney failed to file a Statement of ~-
,,,_ t--,.;u, 
Appeal, thereby resulting in dismissal II App. 60a, and ... ... ' 
the DC then granted habeas relief. Its judgment stayed the writ 
for 120 days in order to give the State an opportunity to rein--
~ state resp's direct appeal ~ initiate P:_?~edin~s to ,::_try him. 
~ It also referred the conduct of resp's counsel (the same as his 
counsel on habeas) to the Board of Governors of the Ky. State Bar 
Assoc. 
On first appeal, the CA6 refused to pass on the ineffec-
tive assistance claim. Instead, it remanded the case for deter-
mination of whether the dismissal violated equal protection since 
no such action appeared to have been taken in any other case 
under similar facts. Judge Jones dissented, simply stating that 
"[a]ppellate counsel's failure to comply with Kentucky's Rule of 
Appellate Procedure l.095(a) (1), causing dismissal of the appeal 
without a consideration of the merits, is ineffective assistance 
of counsel violative of due process." Lucey v. Seabold, 645 F.2d 
547, 548 (1981) (original emphasis). 





ing was unnecessary. They stipulated that no equal protection ~ ff //J 
issue existed in the action. Resp then asked the DC to reissue 
the writ previously granted. The DC agreed to but stayed the 
writ for the same period as before. Its memorandum opinion, more 
· be 
thorough than before, relied exclusively on CA6 precedent recog-
nizing a right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal. 
No. 83-1378 page 4. 
On second appeal, the CA6 rejected Ky's argument that 
"since there is 'no constitutional due process entitlement to 
state-court appeal[] and assistance of counsel (it exists only at 
trial) it is clear that [resp] suffered no constitutional 
deprivation when his state appeal was lawfully dismissed.'" App. 
65a. Although the CA6 recognized that due process does not ere-
-===--
ate a right to appeal, see McKane v. Durston, 153 u.s. 684 
(1894), it held that once a state creates an appellate system 
that system must comport with due process. Following its own 
precedent, the CA6 held that counsel's failure to file all the 
necessary appellate papers violated resp' s right to ef fee ti ve 
appellate counsel. It accordingly affirmed the DC judgment. 
II. Discussion. 
Both parties misun~rstaru3 the case. The State argues 
that a right to effective assistance of appellate counsel can 
stem only from the right to an appeal. And this Court, it cor-
rectly points out, has held that the Constitution does not guar-
antee such a right. McKane v. Durston, supra. In its view, 
Lt....J-r.-wf IN-,~ 7) 
since appeal is permissive, the State can condition it on any 
-'\ 
procedural requirements it wishes. Any other regime, it adds, 
would make state appellate rules virtually unenforceable since a 
defendant could "cure" any default by claiming ineffective as-
sistapce. 
Resp, on the other hand, points out that the Ky. Con-
.._________, 
stitution grants a right to a direct appeal, Ky. Const., §115, ----~--------------__,. 
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right to effective assistance of counsel. He also correctly 
notes that the state and lower federal courts have uniformly held 
that such a right exists. The State, in turn, argues that these 
cases all rest on equal protection grounds, which, it was stipu-
lated, is not an issue here. Resp disagrees. 
The majoE.._~blem with both sig,es' arguments is that Jlu.,1...:/-
t he right to effective assistance. '--t> ----.....___;:.. _____________ 1 ~ 
Both wrongly assume that it must spring from a right to a eal.~~ 
They disagree only about where this right to appeal must be lo- =-~ 
cated: the State insisting that it must be located in the federal ~a-
~tJ-
Constitution, while resp argues that the state constitution or ~ 
perhaps a statute will do. There are of course many other legal ~-
problems in the roads they travel, · but because their initial as-
sumptions are so mistaken there is not much point in developing 
and evaluating their subsequent arguments. Once the ~ of J 
the right to effective assistance is properly located, most of I 
the difficulties in the case disappear. 
/ In Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586 (1982) (per curiam) 
(summary aff irmance), this Court identified the source of this 
right. In that case, a state prisoner's retained counsel failed 
to file a cert petn with the Fla. s.ct. on time and the Fla. )./J.~ 
s.ct. dismissed the application. The prisoner then filed for 
habeas in DC contending that his retained counsel's failure to 
file on time violated his right to effective assistance. The DC , 
denied the writ because it believed that his counsel's failure 
did not render the proceedings fundamentally unfair. In reaching 
No. 83-1378 page 6. 
this conclusion, it thought significant the fact that Fla. s.ct. 
review was d~y. 
~ 
The CA5 reversed on the basis of two cases. One, a 
prior CA5 case, held that appointed counsel's failure to file 
timely for cert in state court constituted ineffective assist-
ance. The other,~uyler v. Sullivan, 446 u.s. 335 (1980), held 
that defendants who retain counsel and those who have counsel 
appointed for them enjoy the same right to effective assistance. ~~ 
Together, the CA5 held, these two cases implied a right to effec-
tive assistance of retained ~ounsel on discretionary review. 
~ tJ ~L} V 7 b:J:l::-?A.-
Jl4ii s°Cour t teversed summarily and in the process demon-
/\ ~ 
strated how to analyze this type of claim. In Ross v. Moffitt, 
417 U.S. 600 (1974), the Court noted, it had held that a criminal 
defendant does not have a constitutional right to counsel while 
pursuing discretionary state appeals or applying for review in 
this Court. The Court believed Ross controlled, because "[s]ince ------
respondent had no constitutional right to counsel, he could not 
be deprived of the effective assistance of counsel by his re-
tained counsel's failure to file the application timely." Wain-
wright v. Torna, 455 U.S., at 587-588 (footnote omitted). In 
other words, the Court found the source of the right to effective __________________ _::,. ___ ~c- - --
1 ,• ' I/ 
assistance not in the ~ight to an ap_e_eal ~ _r _a_t_h_e_r_ 1=·n=-_t _h_e_right 
• \ \ ~ ------ er ,::, =  
to counsel. T~s, one's right to effective assistance at a par-
ticular appellate level depends not on one's statutory or consti-, 
tutional right to that level of appeal but rather on an 
indigent's constitutional right to have counsel appointed at that 
P~- L 
No. 83-1378 page 7. 
Applying the Torna analysis to the present case is 
straight-forward. In Douglas v. California, 372 u.s. 353 (1963), 
v 
the Court held that the Cons ti tut ion guaranteed the right to 
counsel on first appeal. It based this right on both due process -
and equal protection grounds. See Ross v. Moffitt, 417 u.s., at 
609. In the present case, since it was his first appeal that his 
counsel failed to perfect, resp did have a right to effective 7:;::!:,. 
ass ~ ta~e. The only interesting question is whether this right~ 
~ -?"-* 
was violated. Unfortunately, neither party addresses this issue. ).p 
B::h just-:ssume that counsel violated such a right if it exists.:Z:::::, 
Because the briefs offer no guidance as to standards of effective d2--c-~t-
. 1 h f d' · · ·1 ~~ .. assistance on appea , t e rest o my 1scuss1on 1s necessar1 y  cp ~
tentative. ~~ 
Last Term in ~ rickland v. Washington, 104 s.ct. 2052 ~ 
~f' (1984), this Court determined the standards for ineffective as-~ 
~~istance of trial counsel. The test has two prongs. In order to 
~- obtain a new trial, the defendant must show both ( i} that his 
counsel's behavior was professionally unreasonable, id. at 2065-
2066, and (ii} that there is a reasonable probability that, but 
for counsel's unprofessional errors, the _result of the proceeding 
would have been different, id. at 2068. The Court also recog-
nized, however, that in some limited circumstances, such as actu-
al or constructive denial of assistance of counsel, prejudice can 
be presumed because it "is so likely that case by case inquiry 
into prejudice is not worth the cost." Id. at 2067. 
To decide this case, it is probably unwise and unneces-
sary for the Court to adopt any general rule such as the 
No. 83-1378 page 8. 
Strickland standard. Further reflection in the lower courts on 
the type of standards best applied to appellate claims would be 
helpful, especially since the briefs do not speak to this issue 
at all. Furthermore, a procedural error like the one here would 
probably amount to a per se violation under almost any st~ndard. 
A court would most likely presume prejudice from any procedural 
error that cuts off the right to an appeal entirely. Spending 
time analyzing prejudice in such a situation would serve little . 
function. In - most cases, it would lead only to an inefficient 
duplication of effort. In effect, the court deciding the inef-
fective assistance claim would have to decide the merits of the 
underlying appeal. In other words, it would have to decide the 
appeal in order to decide whether the state appeals court should 
decide it. 
In practical terms, this 
than that involved in Strickland. 
is ~ a ~tuS:_h d1:,:_fereg t _l.,nquiry ~-
There, the appellate court, 
~




a particular trial error would have made a difference 1--44 l.u"'-' 
~ 
the overall context of the case. It must decide only ~ 
whether a particular error could reasonably be thought to have 
shifted the weight of the rest of the case from one verdict to 
the other. A court looking at an initial appellate procedural 
----- ?::::,a 
error, however, is working in a vacuum. Although it has a trial 
record, since the procedural error cut off the appeal entirely, 
• 
the court has no appellate context to work from. To judge 
whether an appeal would have made a difference, it would, in ef-
feet, have to decide the appeal itself. Of course, a per se rule - --------------------





~ ~~ .. ,.._~ .. ~ page 9. 
/h.L.~:.~.,e=~ 
~  a ;1 I ~ .._, ~ · · 
1'-1 • , 
should not expend to all 
~ 
appellate ineffective assistance claims. 
Such a rule would be most inappropriate when the charge is that 
counsel failed to make an argument well or perhaps at all. In 
such situations, something like the two-pronged Strickland test 
should apply. 
Applying a per se rule here, moreover, would pose no 
special danger to a state's enforcement of its appellate rules. 
'!he State argues that such rules would be meaningless if a de-
fendant could "cure" an~ default by claiming i neffecti ye assist-
ance. For one thing, however, a per se rule would remove only -one (albeit a powerful) incentive for following the State's ap-
pellate procedures. Although a defendant who defaults and claims -
ineffective assistance may get a second crack at appeal, his 
counsel runs the risk of bar proceedings and damage to his pro-
fessional reputation. In this case, in fact, the DJ reported 
counsel to the Ky. Bar Committee. The threat of these sanctions 
would most likely keep a lawyer from abusing ineffective assist-
ance claims. For another thing, there is little gain to be got-









follow a state's procedural rules in order to try to obtain some',.,/:;a~7:'t-
strategic advantage. F~ 
Finally, there is no merit to the State's claim that a ~ /.Jt>'l) 
right to effective appellate counsel poses some special danger to 
state court procedures. The truth is that it poses no greater 
Both "cure" any procedural default by granting a new hearing or 
trial. - In the trial context, the courts have recognized that the ,, I .. 11~-1-niJc28/~t-~ ~r'-... (~, -s-
~ ~ ~ ~'"'-=,I ~ ~ ~ ~ 
J4.., ~~/4-~ z:-
No. 83-1378 
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state's interest in procedtrral regularity and the defendant's 
interest in a fair trial must both be accomodated. A similar 
accomodation is no more dangerous--or less necessary--on appeal. 
III. Summary. 
Under this Court's decision in Torna, the right to ef-
fective assistance of appellate counsel depends on an indigent's 
v. California, this Court held ~hJp ~ onstitution 
right to counsel on first ap~ a i~ Thus, unless the 
to overrule either Torna (a summary reversal) or 
~ Douglas, it must find that resp had a right to effective assist-
ance of counsel on his direct appeal in this case. 
I would 
IV. Recommendation . aft,~ ..ti.J' W / 6> ~ 
recommend affirming the CA6 without laying ;;wn~ 
~ --
an general appellate effective assistance standard • Not only 
have the parties failed completely to brief this issue, but also 
Strickland's recentness means that the state and lower federal 
courts have not had time to consider whether and how it might 
apply to appeals. Furthermore, an appellate procedural default, 
like this one, that cuts off completely the right to appeal would 
appear to be a per se violation under almost any test the Court 
~ ---......-,, ,,..., ............ '-
might devise. Thus, affirming the CA6 without laying down a gen-• 
eral test would answer the narrow question presented--whether a 
right to effective appellate counsel exists--, dispose of it 
No. 83-1378 Jf ~ .j_£~,t,:;~A ~ r-· 'r~ 411-1,.-~ page 
l/'f,,;'- ~,'-- . ,i' , rll-
~~ I dZ.. -f. ..-· 1- t.J. r)) ~ ~ 
~/-AA--~ 4-<-~ 
10. 
state's interest in procedtrral regularity and the defendant's 
interest in a fair trial must both be accomodated. A similar 
accomodation is no more dangerous--or less necessary--on appeal. 
III. Summary. 
Under this Court's decision in Torna, the right to 
fective assistance of appellate counsel depends on an indig~ 
counsel at that particular level of app1 
v. California, this Court held t~J t ~ onstitu 
right to counsel on first ap~~{ ! Thus, unless "-.I.JC 
to overrule either Torna (a summary reversal) or 
~ Douglas, it must find that resp had a right to effective assist-
ance of counsel on his direct appeal in this case. 
I would 
IV. Recommendation. af(~~v/t, ~ 
recommend affirming the CA6 without laying t;wn~ ---- --
an general appellate effective assistance standard. Not only 
have the parties failed completely to brief this issue, but also 
Strickland's recentness means that the state and lower federal 
courts have not had time to consider whether and how it might 
apply to appeals. Furthermore, an appellate procedural default, 
like this one, that cuts off completely the right to appeal would 
appear to be a per se violation under almost any test the Court 
might devise. Thus, affirming the CA6 without laying down a gen-, 
eral test would answer the narrow question presented--whether a 
right to effective appellate counsel exists--, dispose of it 
No. 83-1378 page 11. 
fairly, and leave for another day the question of what violates 
that right. 
~ f3- lfp/ss 10/08/84 KAVA SALLY-POW 
83-1378 Kavanaugh v. Lucey (CA6 on Federal Habeas) 
The following are miscellaneous notes possibly 
relevant to consideration of the above case. 
bench memo, and my preliminary memo to file. 
See Dan's 
Ross v. Moffitt, 417 u.s. 600, held that a 
criminal defendant does not have a constitutional right to 
counsel to pursue discretionary state appeals. 
In Wainwright v. Torna, 455 u.s. 
:;;-J77 
JU (a PC 
decision reversing CA5) , the Florida Supreme Court had 
dismissed an appeal on the ground that the application was 
not filed timely. The convicted felon filed a §2254 
petition for habeas, contending that he had been denied 
his right to effective assistance of counsel by the 
failure of his retained counsel to comply with the 
appellate court's rules. In Florida at that time an 
appeal was purely discretionary, and therefore under Ross -
v. Moffitt the er iminal defendant had no constitutional 
right to counsel to pursue an appeal. In Wainwright we 
4ud 
therefore hGM: 
"Since respondent had no constitutional right to 
counsel, he could not be deprived of the 
effective assistance of counsel by retained 
counsel's failure to file the application 
timely." 
And in footnote in the PC opinion, we said: 
"Respondent was not denied due process of law by 
the fact that counsel deprived him of his right 
to petition the Florida Supreme Court for 
review. Such deprivation - even if implicating 
a due process interest - was c ~ is 
counsel, and not by the state. The action of 
~ Florida Supreme Court in dismissing an 
application for review that was not filed timely 
did not deprive respondent of due process of 
law." 455 u.s., at 588, n. 4. 
* * * 
In this case, where Kentucky provided a right of 
appeal, h ~~~l "ht t apparently t ere/\~ a const1 tut1ona r 19 o 
counsel derived from the Equal Protection Clause {®C S it 
ma-ke d".li}' J i ffetEnL ~at~ n this case it is stipulated that 
there was no denial of equal protection?) Respondent's 
appeal was dismissed by the Kentukcy Court of Appeals 
because retained counsel failed in his petition to include 
certain formal information required by Kentucky Rules. 




effective assistance, and 
was entitled eitherWfor 





case is troublesome. On the one hand, it 
unfair when an appeal of right exists, if 
that right is frustrated by an error of counsel. A right 
to sue counsel often would be unproductive, and the 
defendant would have lost an opportunity to reverse his 
conviction. On the other hand, a state has a substantial 
interest in enforcing its own appeallate rules, and the 
penalty on the state of reinstating the appeal or granting 
a new trial is not an insubstantial one. 
Of course, as Dan's memo points out, there has 
been no finding in this case of ineffective assistance. 
Yet, counsel surely is ineffective if he fails to comply 
with the Rules, and apparently excuses are not acceptable 
because of the possible injustice to the convicted client. 
We know here how frequently requests for extensions of 
time are filed because of illness, demands of other work, 
presence of a new counsel, etc. !tr~~~-~ 
T ~ ~· ~ I -{Ir- ..:  
In terns of fairness, a convicted defendant wh~ 
has only a discretionary right to appeal may well be ~ 
injured as seriously by failure of counsel to perfect the 
appeal as the defendant who loses a right to appeal 
because of counsel's negligence. Yet, as the footnote in 
Torna states, where the appeal is discretionary ~ there 
is no constitutional right to counsel (Ross v. Moffitt). 
The deprivation is "caused by counsel and not by the 
state". I must say that this is a good deal less than a 
... 
~ 
satisfactory reason/ (such an important difference: in one 
case the convicted defendant gets a new trial and in the 
other case he does not. In a rational system of justice, 
one would think there should not be this disparate result. 
Possibly the distinction between a discretionary and an 
absolute right of appeal is an unsound one, and that Ross 
v. Moffitt should be reconsidered. 
lfp/ss 10/10/84 LUCEY SALLY-POW 
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Rights on Appeal: 
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12. 
Protection Clause requires that where an 
The Equal 
indigent 
defendant has a right of appeal he be given a transcript 
of the trial record. 
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353. Involves 
the right of an indigent to appointed counsel on a first 
appeal where the state grants the right to such an appeal. 
The first appeal in California was to a District Court of 
Appeal, and Douglas' request for counsel was denied. 
Following Griff in, and on equal protection grounds, this 
Court held that where the "first appeal, granted as a 
matter of right to rich and poor alike, an indigent must 
be provided counsel." 
Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600. We held that 
there is no constitutional right to an appeal, and 
therefore when an appeal is discretionary only there is no 
right to appointed counsel or to the effective assistance 
of counsel. My understanding of Moffitt is that it 
applies to any discretionary appeal - whether a first or 
second appeal. 
Wainwright v. Torna, 455 u.s. 586. In a Per 
Curiam by John Stevens, where retained counsel had failed 
to file appeal on time we held there was no denial of a 
constitutional right as appeal was only discretionary. 
The deprivation resulted from private action (the neglect 
of counsel); not from deprivation of a constitutional 
right. 
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CHAMl!ll!:RS 01' 
JUSTICE w .. . J , BRENNAN, JR. 
••ffltt aro-mt af flrt '1ntta .ihdt• 
'1u~ J. <lf. 20ffe'l, 
October 12, 1984 
No. 83-1378 
Kavanaugh v. Lucey 
Dear Chief, 
I'll try my hand at an opinion for 
the Court in the above case. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
;e,u.p:rtttt.f "'funrt ur Uft ~~D ~tatt 
-.rzul!pttghm. ~- OJ. 20ffe)!, 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
October 1 , 1984 
Re: No. 83-1378 Kavanaugh v. Lucey 
Dear Chief, 
I would be happy to take on the dissent in this case. 
Sincerely, r 
The Chief Justice 
ur r 11...,c:.. ur Inc:.. 1...,L..c:..H'r. 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20543 
October 25, 1984 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: Paul Kavanaugh, Superintendent, 
Blackburn Correctional Complex and 
David L. Armstrong v. Keith E. Lucey 
No. 83-1378 
When the above case was argued before you on 
October 10, 1984, counsel for respondent Lucey was 
requested to submit a letter indicating whether his 
client wished to continue with his case. 
Attached is a copy of the letter which I 
received from counsel for Mr. Lucey. 
Attachment 
Respectfully submitted, 
Alexander L. Stevas 
Clerk 
WILLIAM M. RADIGAN 
PATRICIA G . WALKER 
WALKER & RADIGAN 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
SUITE 303, LEGAL ARTS BUILDING 
200 SOUTH SEVENTH STREET, LOUISVILLE, KY, 40202 
October 22, 1984 
Mr. Alexander L. Stevas, Clerk 
Supreme Court of the United States 
1 First Street, N.E. 
Washington, D.C. 20543 
I 
OCT 2 5 1984 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
SUPREME COURT, U.S. 
(5021 583-7713 
RE: Kavanaugh and Armstrong v. Lucey, No. 83-1378 
Dear Mr. Stevas: 
During the oral argument in the above-captioned case on 
October 10, 1984, Chief Justice Burger raised the issue of 
mootness inasmuch as Mr. Lucey had been released from parole and 
had had his civil rights restored. The Chief Justice 
specifically requested that I contact Mr. Lucey to find out 
whether he still wishes to continue his case. 
I wrote to Mr. Lucey upon my return to Louisville on 
Thursday, October 11, 1984. Today I finally received Mr. Lucey's 
response. 
Mr. Lucey unequivocally wishes to continue with his case. He 
believes that he has valid claims on his appeal of his 
conviction, and wishes, as he has since 1978, to have his direct 
appeal to the Court of Appeals of Kentucky reinstated, if 
possible. Consequently, Mr. Lucey would like to complete his 
present case before this Court. 
I hope that this will prove to be sufficient. If there are 
any questions on this matter, please feel free to contact me. 
s5;;:~ 
William M. Radigan 
WMR:klm 
cc: Mr. Gerald Henry 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
•uprmu (!Jiturl .rf tlf.t ~t.tb •mt.ts 
'Jl'u1fitqlhm. ~- QJ. 2'.llffe'l;l 
November 29, 1984 
Re: 83-1378 - Kavanaugh v. Lucey 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 
Respectfully, 
Justice Brennan 




JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
.:t'ltpt'tntt '4-0lU"t OT Uft ~tD :L'IltUS 
-as1pngtcn. ~- <4, 2llffe~, V 
November 29, 1984 
Re: No.83-1378 Kavanaugh v. Lucey 
Dear Bill, 
In due course I will circulate a dissent in this case. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Brennan 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBER S OF 
JUST ICE SANORA DAY O'CONNOR 
.tiqrrtntt ~DUrt of l4t Juittb ~tatt~ 
Jliudrhtgton, !}. ~. 2llffe~, 
November 29, 1984 
Re: No. 83-1378 Kavanaugh v. Lucey 
Dear Bill: 
I am generally content with the analysis of your 
draft opinion and I agree with its conclusion. I do, 
however, ~ v. wo concerns with the draft as currently 
written. irst the second complete sentence on page 8, if 
taken out c ontext, might suggest a right to effective 
assistance of counsel in judicial proceedings in general. I 
am troubled by such a suggestion, and I would prefer that 
the sentence be deleted. 
My second, .a~ more general, concern is that part 
I. C. of the draft g~~ too little attention to the 
distinction drawn by Ross v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600 (1974), 
between appeals as of right and discretionary appeals. It 
would be desirable, in my view, to acknowledge our holding 
M 
in Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586 (1982) (per curiam), 
that there is no right to counsel, and therefore no right to 
effective assistance of counsel, for ~ cr ~ iona~~ ape eals. 
Some discussion on this point would, I believe, 1t 
logically into the analysis of the right to effective 
assistance for a first appeal as of right that appears at 
pages 8 and 9 of the draft. 
If you could accommodate my concerns in this 
regard, I would be happy to join your opinion. 
Sincerely 
Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
' 
dro 11/30/84 
To: JUSTICE POWELL 
From: Dan 
MEMORANDUM 
IE: JUSTICE BRENNAN'S opinion in Kavanaugh v. Lucey, No. 83-
1378. 
written. 
JUSTICE BRENNAN'S opinion is very well reasoned and well 
I have only a few comments. First, I agree with JUS-
TICE O'CONNOR'S two suggestions: (i) dropping the second complete 
sentence on page 8 or at least making it clear that the term "ju-
dicial proceedings" is used in a quite limited sense and (ii) 
tying together some of the analysis through Wainwright v. Torna. 
Second, if I remember correctly, you were troubled by finding 
ineffective assistance in the context of a jurisdictional bar to 
appeal. JUSTICE BRENNAN'S present opinion makes clear that the 
default here is non-jurisdictional, but nothing in the reasoning 
of the opinion limits the holding to this situation. Thus, lower 
courts will probably apply the holding to jurisdictional defaults 
too. I am still not convinced that ineffective assistance should 
be analyzed differently in the context of jurisdictional de-
faults. But if you still feel strongly that it should be, you 
cou1d ask JUSTICE BRENNAN to make clear that the holding extends 
only to non-jurisdictional defaults. Such a course would leave 
the case of jurisdictional defaults to another day. 
2nd DRAFT 








From: Justice Brennan 
Circulated: ________ _ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 83-1378 
PAUL KAVANAUGH, SUPERINTENDENT, BLACK-
BURN CORRECTIONAL COMPLEX AND DAVID 
L. ARMSTRONG, ATTORNEY GENERAL, 
PETITIONERS v. KEITH E. LUCEY --
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 
[December - , 1984] 
.,- -
,l.fuSTICE BRENNAN dj livered the opinion of the Court. 
~ ouglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353 (1963), held that the 
Fourteenth .Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the 
right to counsel on his first appeal as of right. In this case, 
we must decide whether the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment guarantees the criminal defendant the 
effective assistance of counsel on such an appeal. 
I 
On March 21, 1976, a Kentucky jury found respondent 
guilty of trafficking in controlled substances. His retained 
counsel filed a timely notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals 
of Kentucky, the state intermediate appellate court. Ken-
tucky Rule of Appellate Procedure 1.095(a)(l) requires appel-
lants to serve on the appellate court the record on appeal and 
a "Statement of Appeal" that is to contain the names of appel-
lants and appellees, counsel, and the trial judge, the date of 
judgment, the date of notice of appeal, and additional in- • 
formation. 1 See England v. Spalding, 460 S. W. 2d 4, 6 
1 Kentucky Rule of Appellate Procedure 1.090 provided: 
"In all cases the appellant shall file with the record on appeal a statement 
setting forth : (a) The name of each appellant and each appellee .. . (b) The 
--;1 _ ~ / name and address of counsel for each appellant and each appellee. (c) The 
I IA' ~ .lr 4 ti' /1,_(_(Jy f <)<'4.-k > :r; u:;t:c. e [) I Ct, ~ "'~,. 's ~ (,, 't"5 l;·e-. 5 




(Ky. 1970) (rule "is designed to assist this court in processing 
records and is not jurisdictional"). Respondent's counsel 
failed to file a Statement of Appeal when he filed his brief and 
the record on appeal on September 12, 1977. 2 
When the State filed its brief, it included a motion to dis-
miss the appeal for failure to file a Statement of Appeal. 
The Court of Appeals granted this motion because "appellant 
has failed to supply the information required by RAP 
1.095(a)(l)." J. A. 37a. Respondent moved for reconsider-
ation, arguing that all of the information necessary for a 
statement of appeal was in fact included in his brief, albeit in 
a somewhat different format. At the same time, respondent 
tendered a Statement of Appeal that formally complied with 
the State rules. The Court of Appeals summarily denied the 
motion for reconsideration. Petitioner sought discretionary 
review in the Supreme Court of Kentucky, but the judgment 
of the Court of Appeals was affirmed in a one-sentence order. 
In a final effort to gain State appellate review of his convic-
tion, respondent moved the trial court to vacate the judg-
name and address of the trial judge. (d) The date the judgment appealed 
from was entered, and the page of the record on appeal on which it may be 
found .... (e) The date the notice of appeal was filed and the page of the 
record on appeal on which it may be found. (f) Such of the following facts, 
if any, as are true: (1) a notice of cross appeal has been filed; (2) a superse-
deas bond has been executed; (3) any reason the appeal should be ad-
vanced; (4) this is a suit involving multiple claims and judgment has been 
made final ... ; (5) there is another appeal pending in a case which involves 
the same transaction or occurrence, or a common question of law or fact, 
with which this appeal should be consolidated, giving the style of the other 
case; (6) the appellant is free on bond." 
2 The argument headings on the appellate brief were: "I. Was it error to 
admit photographs of the appellant into evidence which lacked any proba-
tive value and served only to mislead and to arouse the passion and preju-
dice of the jury? II. Did the charge to the jury meet the requirements of 
the due process of law? III. Was the appellant denied his constitutional 
right to a fair trial by improper conduct during the trial and by prejudicial 
comments made by the prosecutor during his summation?" Joint Appen-
dix, at 7a-8a. The merits of none of these claims are before us. 
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mentor to grant a .belated appeal. The trial court denied the 
motion. 
Respondent then sought federal habeas corpus relief in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Ken-
tucky. He challenged the constitutionality of the State's dis-
missal of his appeal because of his lawyer's failure to file the 
Statement of Appeal, on the ground that the dismissal de-
prived him of his right to effective assistance of counsel on 
appeal guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
District Court granted respondent a conditional writ of ha-
beas corpus ordering his release unless the State either rein-
stated his appeal or retried him. 3 The State appealed to the 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which reached no de-
cision on the merits but instead remanded the case to the Dis-
trict Court for determination whether respondent had a claim 
under the Equal Protection Clause. 
On remand, counsel for both parties stipulated that there 
was no equal protection issue in the case, the only issue being 
whether the State's action in dismissing respondent's appeal 
violated the Due Process Clause. The District Court there-
upon reissued the conditional writ of habeas corpus. On Jan-
uary 12, 1984, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit af-
firmed the judgment of the District Court. We granted the 
State's petition for certiorari. -- U. S. -- (1984). We 
affirm. 4 
3 The district court also referred petitioner's counsel to the Board of 
Governors of the Kentucky State Bar Association for disciplinary proceed-
ings for "attacking his own work product." See J. A. 44a. Petitioner is 
not represented by the same counsel before this Court. 
' The State informed this Court five days prior to oral argument that 
respondent had been finally released from custody and his civil rights, in-
cluding suffrage and the right to hold public office, restored as of May 10, 
1983. However, respondent has not been pardoned and some collateral 
consequences of his conviction remain, including the possibility that the 
conviction would be used to impeach testimony he might give in a future 
proceeding and the possibility that it would be used to subject him to 






Respondent has for the past seven years unsuccessfully 
pursued every avenue open to him in an effort to obtain a de-
cision on the merits of his appeal and to prove that his convic-
tion was unlawful. The Kentucky appellate courts' refusal to 
hear him on the merits of his claim does not stem from any 
view of those merits, and respondent does not argue in this 
Court that the State was constitutionally required to render 
judgment on the appeal in his favor. Rather the issue we 
must decide is whether the State's dismissal of the appeal, 
despite the ineffective assistance of respondent's counsel on 
appeal, violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
Before analyzing the merits of respondent's contention, it 
is appropriate to emphasize two limits on the scope of the 
question presented. First, there is no challenge to the Dis-
trict Court's finding that respondent indeed received ineffec-
tive assistance· of counsel on appeal. Respondent alleges-
and the State does not deny in this Court-that his counsel's 
failure to obey a simple court rule that could have such dras-
tic consequences required this finding. We therefore need 
not decide the content of appropriate standards for judging 
claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Cf. 
Strickland v. Washington, -- U. S. -- (1984); United 
States v. Cronic, -- U. S. -- (1984). Second, the stipu-
lation in the District Court on remand limits our inquiry 
solely to the validity of the State's action under the Due Proc-
ess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 
Respondent's claim arises at the intersection of two lines of 
cases. In one line, we have held that the Fourteenth 
Amendment guarantees a criminal appellant pursuing a first 
felony charges in the future. This case is thus not moot. See Cara/as v. 
LaVallee, 391 U. S. 234, 238 (1968); Sibron v. United States, 392 U. S. 40, 
55-57 (1968). 
5 Seemingly, respondent entered the stipulation because his attorney on 
appeal had been retained, not appointed. 
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appeal as of right certain minimum safeguards necessary to 
make that appeal "adequate and effective," see Griffin v. Illi-
nois, 351 U. S. 12, 20 (1956); among those safeguards are the 
right to counsel, see Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353 
(1961). In the second line, we have held that the trial-level 
right to counsel, created by the Sixth Amendment and ap-
plied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, see 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335, 344 (1963), compre-
hends the right to effective assistance of counsel. See 
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U. S. 335, 344 (1980). The question 
presented in this case is whether the appellate-level right to 
counsel also comprehends the right to effective assistance of 
counsel. 
A 
Almost a century ago, the Court held that the Constitution 
does not require States to grant appeals as of right to crimi-
nal defendants seeking to review alleged trial court errors. 
M cKane v. Durston, 153 U. S. 684 (1894). Nonetheless, if a 
State has created appellate courts as "an integral part of the 
... system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a 
defendant," Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12, 18 (1956) (plu-
rality opinion), the procedures used in deciding appeals must 
comport with the demands of the Due Process and Equal Pro-
tection Clauses of the Constitution. In Griffin itself, a tran-
script of the trial court proceedings was a prerequisite to a 
decision on the merits of an appeal. See id., at 13-14. We 
held that the State must provide such a transcript to indigent 
criminal appellants who could not afford to buy one if that 
was the only way to assure an "adequate and effective" ap-
peal. Id., at 20; see also Eskridge v. Washington State 
Board of Prison Terms and Paroles, 357 U. S. 214, 215 
(1958) (per curiam) (invalidating state rule giving free tran-
scripts only to defendants who could convince trial judge that 
"justice will thereby be promoted"); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U. S. 
252 (1959) (invalidating state requirement that indigent de-




Lane v. Brown, 372 U. S. 477 (1963) (invalidating procedure 
whereby meaningful appeal was possible only if public de-
fender requested a transcript); Draper v. Washington, 372 
U. S. 487 (1963) (invalidating state procedure providing for 
free transcript only for a defendant who could satisfy the trial 
judge that his appeal was not frivolous). 
Just as a transcript may by rule or custom be a pre-
requisite to appellate review, the services of a lawyer will for 
virtually every layman be necessary to present an appeal in a 
form suitable for appellate consideration on the merits. See 
Griffin, 351 U. S., at 20. Therefore, Douglas v. California, 
supra, recognized that the principles of Griffin required a 
State that afforded a right of appeal to make that appeal 
more than a "meaningless ritual" by supplying an indigent 
appellant in a criminal case with an attorney. 372 U. S., at 
358. This right to counsel is limited to the first appeal as of 
right, see Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U. S. 600 (1974), and the attor-
ney need not advance every argument, regardless of merit, 
urged by the appellant, see Jones v. Barnes, -- U. S. --
(1983). But the attorney must be available to assist in pre-
paring and submitting a brief to the appellate court, Swenson 
v. Bosler, 386 U. S. 258 (1967) (per curiam) and must play 
the role of an active advocate, rather than a mere friend of 
the court assisting in a detached evaluation of the appellant's 
claim. See Anders v. California, 386 U. S. 738 (1967); see 
also Entsminger v. Iowa, 386 U. S. 748 (1967). 
B 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963), held that the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel was "so fundamental and 
essential to a fair trial, and so, to due process oflaw, that it is 
made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." Id., at 340, quoting Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455, 
465 (1942); see also Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932); 
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 (1938). Gideon rested on 
the "obvious truth" that lawyers are "necessities, not luxu-
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ries" in our adversarial system of criminal justice. Id., at 
344. "The very premise of our adversary system of criminal 
justice is that partisan advocacy on both sides of a case will 
best promote the ultimate objective that the guilty be con-
victed and the innocent go free." Herring v. New York, 422 
U. S. 853, 862 (1975). The defendant's liberty depends on 
his ability to present his case in the face of "the intricacies of 
the law and the advocacy of the prosecutor," United States v. 
Ash, 413 U. S. 300, 309 (1973); a criminal trial is thus not con-
ducted in accord with due process of law unless the defendant 
has counsel to represent him. 6 
As we have made clear, the guarantee of counsel "cannot 
be satisfied by mere formal appointment," Avery v. Ala-
bama, 308 U. S. 444 (1940). "That a person who happens to 
be a lawyer is present at trial alongside the accused, how-
ever, is not enough to satisfy the constitutional command. 
An accused is entitled to be assisted by an attorney, 
whether retained or appointed, who plays the role necessary 
to ensure that the trial is fair." Strickland v. Washington, 
-- U. S. --, -- (1984); see also McMann v. Richard-
son, 397 U. S. 759, 771 n. 14 (1970) ("It has long been recog-
nized that the right to counsel is the right to the effective as-
6 Our cases dealing with the right to counsel-whether at trial or on ap-
peal-have often focused on the defendant's need for an attorney to meet 
the adversary presentation of the prosecutor. See, e.g., Douglas v. Cali-
fornia, 372 U. S. 353, 358 (1963) (noting the benefit of "counsel's examina-
tion into the record, research of the law, and marshalling of arguments on 
[client's] behald"). Such cases emphasize the defendant's need for counsel 
in order to obtain a favorable decision. The facts of this case emphasize a 
different, albeit related, aspect of counsel's role, that of expert professional 
whose assistance is necessary in a legal system governed by complex rules 
and procedures for the defendant to obtain a decision at all-much less a 
favorable decision-on the merits of the case. In a situation like that here, 
counsel's failure was particularly egregious in that it essentially waived 
respondent's opportunity to make a case on the merits; in this sense, it is 
difficult to distinguish respondent's situation from that of someone who had 
no counsel at all. Cf. Anders v. California, 386 U. S. 738 (1967); 
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sistance of counsel."); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U. S. 335, 344 
(1980). Last Term, we emphasized this point while clarify-
ing the standards to be used in assessing claims that trial 
counsel failed to provide effective representation. See 
United States v. Cronic, -- U. S. -- (1984); Strickland 
v. Washington, supra. Because the right to counsel is so 
fundamental to a fair trial, the Constitution can not tolerate 
trials in which counsel, though present in name, is unable to 
assist the defendant to obtain a fair decision on the merits. 
As the quotation from Strickland, supra, makes clear, the 
constitutional guarantee of effective assistance of counsel at 
trial applies to every criminal prosecution, without regard to 
whether counsel is retained or appointed. See Cuyler v. 
Sullivan, supra, at 342-345. The Constitutional mandate is 
addressed to the action of the State in obtaining a criminal 
conviction through a procedure that fails to meet the stand-
ards of due process of law. "Unless a defendant charged 
with a serious offense has counsel able to invoke the proce-
dural and substantive safeguards that distinguish our system 
of justice, a serious risk of injustice infects the trial itself. 
When a State obtains a criminal conviction through such a 
trial, it is the State that unconstitutionally deprives the de-
fendant of his liberty." Cuyler v. Sullivan, supra, at 343 
(citations omitted). 
C 
The two lines of cases mentioned-the cases recognizing 
the right to counsel on a first appeal as of right and the cases 
recognizing that the right to counsel at trial includes a right 
to effective assistance of counsel-are dispositive of respond-
ent's claim. In bringing an appeal as of right from his con-
viction, a criminal defendant is attempting to demonstrate 
that the conviction, and the consequent drastic loss of liberty, 
is unlawful. To prosecute the appeal, a criminal appellant 
must face an adversary proceeding that-like a trial-is gov-
erned by intricate rules that to a layperson would be hope-
lessly forbidding. An unrepresented appellant-like an un-
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represented defendant at trial-is unable to protect the vital 
interests at stake. To be sure, respondent did have nominal 
representation when he brought this appeal. But nominal 
representation on an appeal as of right-like nominal repre-
sentation at trial-does not suffice to render the proceedings 
constitutionally adequate; a party whose counsel is unable to 
provide effective representation is in no better position than 
one who has no counsel at all. 
A first appeal as of right therefore is not adjudicated in ac-
cord with due process of law if the appellant does not have 
the effective assistance of an attorney. 7 This result is 
hardly novel. The petitioners in both Anders v. California, 
386 U. S. 738 (1967), and Entsminger v. Iowa, 386 U. S. 748 
(1967), claimed that, although represented in name by coun-
sel, they had not received the type of assistance constitution-
ally required to render the appellate proceedings fair. In 
both cases, we agreed with the petitioners, holding that 
counsel's failure in Anders to submit a brief on appeal and 
counsel's waiver.in Entsminger of the petitioner's right to a 
full transcript rendered the subsequent judgments against 
the petitioners unconstitutional. 8 In short, the promise of 
Douglas that a criminal defendant has a right to counsel on 
appeal7 l1ke the promise of Gideon that a criminal defendant 
1 A½ws v. Moffitt, 417 U. S. 600 (1974), held, the considerations gov-
erning a discretionary appeal are somewhat different. See infra p. --. 
Of course, the right to effective assistance of counsel is dependent on the 
right to counsel itself. See Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U. S. 586, 587-588 
(1982) (per curiam) ("Since respondent had no constitutional right to coun-
sel, he could not be deprived of the effective assistance of counsel by his 
retained counsel's failure to file the appeal timely.") (footnote omitted). 
8 Moreover, Jones v. Barnes, -- U.S. -- (1983), adjudicated a simi-
lar claim "of ineffective assistance by appellate counsel." Id ., at --. In 
Jones, the appellate attorney had failed to raise every issue requested by 
the criminal defendant. This Court rejected the claim, not because there 
was no right to effective assistance of appellate counsel, but because coun-
sel's conduct in fact served the goal of "vigorous and effective advocacy." 
Id. , at--. The Court's reasoning would have been entirely superfluous 





has a right to counsel at trial-would be a futile gesture un-
less it comprehended the right to the effective assistance of 
counsel. 
Recognition of the right to effective assistance of counsel 
on appeal requires that we affirm the Sixth Circuit's decision 
in this case. The State objects that this holding will disable 
state courts from enforcing a wide range of vital procedural 
rules governing appeals. Counsel may, according to the 
State, disobey such rules with impunity if the state courts are 
precluded from enforcing them by dismissing the appeal. 
The State's concerns are exaggerated. The lower federal 
courts-and many state courts-overwhelmingly have recog-
nized a right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal. 9 
9 See, e. g., Francois v. Wainwright, 741 F. 2d 1275, 1284-1285 (CAll 
1984); Tsirizotakis v. Lefevre, 736 F . 2d 57, 65 (CA2), cert. denied, --
U. S. - (1984); Branch v. Cupp, 736 F . 2d 533, 537-538 (CA9 1984); 
Alvord v. Wainwright, 725 F. 2d 1282, 1291 (CAll), cert. denied, --
U. S. -- (1984); Cunningham v. Henderson, 725 F. 2d 32 (CA2 1984); 
Doyle v. United States, 721 F. 2d 1195 (CA9 1983); Gilbert v. Sowders, 646 
F. 2d 1146 (CA6 1981) (per curiam) (dismissal of appeal because retained 
counsel ran afoul of "highly technical procedural rule" violated due 
process); Perez v. Wainwright, 640 F . 2d 596, 598 n. 3 (CA5 1981) (citing 
cases), cert. denied, 456 U. S. 910 (1982); Robinson v. Wyrick, 635 F. 2d 
757 (CA8 1981); Cleaver v. Bordenkircher, 634 F. 2d 1010 (CA6), cert. de-
nied sub nom. Sowders v. Cleaver, 451 U. S. 1008 (1981); Miller v. McCar-
thy, 607 F. 2d 854, 857-858 (CA91979); Passmore v. Estelle, 594 F. 2d 115 
(CA5 1979), cert. denied , 446 U. S. 937 (1980); Cantrell v. State, 546 F . 2d 
652, 653 (CA5), cert. denied, 431 U. S. 959 (1977); Walters v. Harris, 460 
F. 2d 988, 990 (CA4 1972), cert. denied sub nom. Wren v. United States, 
409 U. S. 1129 (1973); Macon v. Lash, 458 F . 2d 942, 949-950 (CA7 1972); 
Hill v. Page, 454 F . 2d 679 (CAl0 1971) (performance of retained counsel 
on appeal to be judged by standards of Anders and Entsminger); Blan-
chard v. Brewer, 429 F. 2d 89 (CA8 1970) (dismissal of appeal when re-
tained counsel failed to serve papers properly held violation of due proc-
ess); see also Harkness v. State, 264 Ark. 561, 572 S. W. 2d 835 (1978) (per 
curiam); People v. Barton, 21 Cal. 3d 513, 579 P. 2d 1043 (1978); Erb v. 
State, 332 A. 2d 137 (Del. 1974); Hines v. United States, 237 A. 2d 827 
(D. C. App. 1968); Barclay v. Wainwright, 444 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 1984); 
McAuliffe v. Rutledge, 231 Ga. 745, 204 S. E. 2d 141 (1974); State v. Er-
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These decisions do not seem to have had dire consequences 
for the States' ability to conduct appeals in accordance with 
reasonable procedural rules. Nor for that matter has the 
longstanding recognition of a right to effective assistance of 
counsel at trial-including the recognition in Cuyler v. Sulli-
van, supra, that this right extended to retained as well as ap-
pointed counsel-rendered ineffectual the perhaps more com-
plex procedural rules governing the conduct of trials. See 
also United States v. Cronic, supra; Strickland v. Washing-
ton, supra. 
To the extent that a State believes its procedural rules are 
in jeopardy, numerous courses remain open. For example, a 
State may certainly enforce a vital procedural rule by impos-
ing sanctions against the attorney, rather than against the 
client. Such a course may well be more effective than the 
alternative of refusing to decide the merits of an appeal and 
will reduce the possibility that a defendant who was power-
less to obey the rules will serve a term of years in jail on an 
unlawful conviction. If instead a State chooses to dismiss an 
appeal when an incompetent attorney has violated local rules, 
it may do so if such action does not intrude upon the client's 
due process rights. For instance the State of Kentucky it-
self in other contexts has permitted a postconviction attack 
on the trial judgment as "the appropriate remedy for frus-
trated right of appeal," Hammershoy v. Commonwealth, 398 
S. W. 2d 883 (Ky. 1966); this is but one of several solutions 
'Win, 57 Ha. 268, 554 P. 2d 236 (1976); People v. Brown, 39 Ill. 2d 307, 235 
N. E . 2d 562 (1968); Burton v. State, - Ind. -, 455 N. E. 2d 938 
(1983); Wilson v. State, 284 Md. 664, 669-671, 399 A. 2d 256, 258-260 
(1979); Irving v. State, 441 So. 2d 846, 856 (Miss. 1983); People v. Gon-
zalez, 47 N. Y. 2d 606, 393 N. E. 2d 987 (1979); Shipman v. Gladden, 253 
Or. 192, 453 P. 2d 921 (1969); Commonwealth v. Wilkerson, 490 Pa. 296, 
416 A. 2d 477 (1980); Grooms v. State, 320 N. W. 2d 149 (SD 1982); In re 
Savo, 139 Vt. 527, 431 A. 2d 482 (1981); Rhodes v. Leverette, 160 W. Va. 
781, 239 S. E. 2d 136 (1977). These cases diverge widely in the standards 
used to judge ineffectiveness, the remedy ordered, and the rationale used. 




that state and federal courts have permitted in similar 
cases. 10 A system of appeal as of right is established pre-
cisely to assure that only those who are validly convicted 
have their freedom drastically curtailed. A State may not 
extinguish this right because another right of the appellant-
the right to effective assistance of counsel-has been 
violated. 
III 
The State urges that our reasoning rests on faulty 
premises. First, the State argues that because the State 
need not establish a system of appeals as of right in the first 
instance, the State is immune from all constitutional scrutiny 
when it chooses to have such a system. Second, the State 
denies that respondent had the right to counsel on his appeal 
to the Kentucky Court of Appeals because such an appeal 
was a "conditional appeal," rather than an appeal as of right. 
Third, the State argues that, even if its actions here are sub-
ject to constitutional scrutiny and even if the appeal sought 
here was an appeal as of right, the Due Process Clause-
upon which respondent's claimed right to effective assistance 
of counsel is based-has no bearing on the State's actions in 
this case. We take up each of these three arguments in turn. 
A 
In support of its first argument, the State initially relies on 
M cKane v. Durston, supra, which held that a State need not 
provide a system of appellate review as of right at all. See 
also Ross v. Moffitt, supra, at--; Jones v. Barnes, supra, 
10 In Stahl v. Commonwealth, 613 S. W. 2d 617 (Ky. 1981), the Ken-
tucky Supreme Court noted that, if on post-conviction motion the defend-
ant could prove that counsel was ineffective on appeal, "the proper proce-
dure is for the trial court to vacate the judgment and enter a new one, 
whereupon an appeal may be taken from the new judgment." Id ., at 618. 
See also Rodriquez v. United States, 395 U. S. 327, 332 (1969) (ordering 
similar remedy for denial of appeal in federal prosecution); United States v. 




at --. The State derives from this proposition the much 
broader principle that "whatever a state does or does not do 
on appeal-whether or not to have an appeal and if so, how to 
operate it-is of no due process concern to the Constitution 
.... " Brief for Petitioner, at 23. It would follow that the 
State's action in cutting off respondent's appeal because of his 
attorney's incompetence would oe permissible under the Due 
Process Clause. 
This argument need not detain us long. The right to ap-
peal would be unique among state actions if it could be with-
drawn without consideration of applicable due process norms. 
For instance, although a State may choose whether it will in-
stitute any given welfare program, it must operate whatever 
programs it does establish subject to the protections of the 
Due Process Clause. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254, 
262 (1970). Similarly, a State has great discretion in setting 
policies governing parole decisions, but it must nonetheless 
make those decisions in accord with the Due Process Clause. 
See Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 481-484 (1972). See 
also Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365, 374 (1971); Bell v. 
Burson, 402 U. S. 535, 539 (1971); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 
U. S. 398, 404 (1963); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee 
v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123, 165-166 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring). In short, when a state opts to act in a field 
where its action has significant discretionary elements, it 
must nonetheless act in accord with the dictates of the Con-
stitution-and, in particular, in accord with the Due Process 
Clause. 
B 
The State's second argument relies on the holding of Ross 
v. M ofjitt, supra, that a criminal defendant has a right to 
counsel only on appeals as of right, not on discretionary state 
appeals. According to the State, the Kentucky courts per-
mit criminal appeals only on condition that the appellant fol-
low the State rules and statutes governing such appeals. 




Therefore, the system does not establish an appeal as of 
right, but only a "conditional appeal" subject to dismissal if 
the state rules are violated. The State concludes that if re-
spondent has no appeal as of right, he has no right to coun-
sel-or to effective assistance of counsel-on his "conditional 
appeal." 
Under any reasonable interpretation of the line drawn in 
Ross between discretionary appeals and appeals as of right, a 
criminal defendant's appeal of a conviction to the Kentucky 
Court of Appeals is an appeal as of right. Section 115 of the 
Kentucky Constitution provides that "[i]n all cases, civil and . 
criminal, there shall be allowed as a matter of right at least 
one appeal to another court." Unlike the appellant in the 
discretionary appeal in Ross, a criminal appellant in the Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals typically has not had the benefit of a 
previously prepared trial transcript, a brief on the merits of 
the appeal, or a previous written opinion. See Ross, supra, 
at 615. In addition, the State fails to point to any source of 
Kentucky law indicating that a decision on the merits in an 
appeal like that of respondent-unlike the discretionary ap-
peal in Ross-is contingent on a discretionary finding by the 
Court of Appeal.s that the case involves significant public or 
jurisprudential issues; the purpose of a first appeal in the 
Kentucky court system appears to be precisely to determine 
whether the individual defendant has been lawfully con-
victed. In short, a criminal defendant bringing an appeal to 
the Kentucky Court of Appeals has not previously had "an 
adequate opportunity to present his claims fairly in the con-
text of the State's appellate process." See id., at 616. It 
follows that for purposes of analysis under the Due Process 
Clause, respondent's appeal was an appeal as of right, thus 
triggering the right to counsel recognized in Douglas v. Cali-
fornia, 372 U. S. 353 (1963). 
C 
Finally, the State argues that even if the Due Process 
Clause does apply to the manner in which a State conducts its 
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system of appeals and even if the appeal denied to respondent 
was an appeal as of right, the Due Process Clause nonethe-
less is not offended by the State's refusal to decide respond-
ent's appeal on the merits, because that Clause has no role to 
play in granting a criminal appellant the right to counsel-or 
a fortiori to the effective assistance of counsel-on appeal. 
Although it may seem that Douglas and its progeny defeat 
this argument, the State attempts to distinguish these cases 
by exploiting a seeming ambiguity in our previous decisions. 
According to the State, the constitutional requirements 
recognized in Griffin, Douglas, and the cases that followed 
had their source in the Equal Protection Clause, and not the 
Due Process Clause, of the Fourteenth Amendment. In 
support of this contention, the State points out that all of the 
cases in the Griffin line have involved claims by indigent de-
fendants that they have the same right to a decision on the 
merits of their appeal as do wealthier defendants who are 
able to afford lawyers, transcripts, or the other prerequisites 
of a fair adjudication on the merits. As such, the State 
claims, the cases all should be understood as equal protection 
cases challenging the constitutional validity of the distinction 
made between rich and poor criminal defendants. The State 
concludes that if the Due Process Clause permits criminal ap-
peals as of right to be forfeited because the appellant has no 
transcript or no attorney, it surely permits such appeals to be 
forfeited when the appellant has an attorney who is unable to 
assist in prosecuting the appeal. 
The State's argument rests on a misunderstanding of the 
diverse sources of our holdings in this area. In Ross v. M of-
fitt, supra, at 608-609, we held that "[t]he precise rationale 
for the Griffin and Douglas lines of cases has never been ex-
plicitly stated, some support being derived from the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and some 
from the Due Process Clause of that Amendment." Accord 




ess and equal protection principles converge in the Court's 
analysis in these cases.") See also Note, The Supreme 
Court, 1962 Term, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 62, 107, n. 13 (1963) (cit-
ing cases). This rather clear statement in Ross that the Due 
Process Clause played a significant role in prior decisions is 
well supported by the cases themselves. 
In Griffin, for instance, the State had in effect dismissed 
petitioner's appeal because he could not afford a transcript. 
In establishing a system of appeal as of right, the State had 
implicitly determined that it was unwilling to curtail drasti-
cally a defendant's liberty unless ·a second judicial decision-
maker, the appellate court, was convinced that the conviction 
was in accord with law. But having decided that this deter-
mination was so important-having made the appeal the final 
step in the adjudication of guilt or innocence of the individual, 
see Griffin, supra, at 18---the State could not in effect make 
it available only to the wealthy. Such a disposition violated 
equal protection principles because it distinguished between 
poor and rich with respect to such a vital right. But it also 
violated due process principles because it decided the appeal 
in a way that was arbitrary with respect to the issues in-
volved. In Griffin, we noted that a court dispensing "jus-
tice" at the trial level by charging the defendant for the privi-
lege of pleading not guilty "would make the constitutional 
promise of a fair trial a worthless thing." Id., at 17. Decid-
ing an appeal on the same basis would have the same obvi-
ous-and constitutionally fatal-defect. See also Douglas, 
supra, at 357 (procedure whereby indigent defendant must 
demonstrate merit of case before obtaining counsel on appeal 
"does not comport with fair procedure"); Anders v. Califor-
nia, 386 U. S. 738, 744 (1967) ("constitutional requirement of 
substantial equality and fair process can only be attained 




Our decisions in Anders, Entsminger v. Iowa, supra, and 
Jones v. Barnes, supra, are all inconsistent with the State's 
interpretation. As noted above, all of these cases dealt with 
the responsibilities of an attorney representing an indigent 
criminal defendant on appeal. 11 Although the Court reached 
a different result in Jones from that reached in Anders and 
Entsminger, all of these cases rest on the premise that the 
State must supply indigent criminal appellants with attor-
neys who can provide specified types of assistance--that is, 
that such appellants have a right to effective assistance of 
counsel. The State claims that all such rights enjoyed by 
criminal appellants have their source in the Equal Protection 
Clause, and that such rights are all measured by the rights of 
nonindigent appellants. But if the State's argument in the 
instant case is correct, nonindigent appellants themselves 
have no right to effective assistance of counsel. It would fol-
low that indigent appellants also have no right to effective 
assistance of counsel, and all three of these cases erred in 
reaching the contrary conclusion. 
The lesson of our cases, as we pointed out in Ross, supra, 
at 609, is that each Clause triggers a distinct inquiry: "'Due 
Process' emphasizes fairness between the State and the indi-
vidual dealing with the State, regardless of how other indi-
viduals in the same situation may be treated. 'Equal Protec-
tion,' on the other hand, emphasizes disparity in treatment 
by a State between classes of individuals whose situations are 
arguably indistinguishable." 12 In cases like Griffin and I 
Douglas, due process concerns were involved because the 
States involved had set up a system of appeals asofnght but 
- -=====----------
11 See supra p. -. 
12 See also Bearden v. Georgia, - U.S. -, - (1983). We went 
on in Ross to analyze the issue presented there-the right to counsel on 
discretionary appeals-primarily in terms of the Equal Protection Clause. 
See id., at 611. However, neither Ross nor any of the other cases in the 
Griffin line ever rejected the proposition that the Due Process Clause ex-




had refused to offer each defendant a fair opportunity to ob-
tain an adjudication on the merits of his appeal. Equal pro-
tection concerns were involved because the State treated a . 
class of defendants-indigent ones-differently for purposes 
of offering them a meaningful appeal. Both of these con-
cerns were implicated in the Griffin and Douglas cases and 
both Clauses supported the decisions reached by this Court. 
Affirmed. 
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